Yao's Reading List
From NSAC @ Stony Brook
This is Yao's reading list (Spring 2008):
- Dec
- 3-5 Oct
- Note
- 13th June
- How to Be a Good Graduate Student([8])
- 10th June
- PPay: Micropayments for Peer-to-Peer Systems ([9])
- 9th June
- Reading on Micropayment
- Spring Break
- The micropayment problem
- Second generation micropayment systems: lessons learned([15])
- PayWord and MicroMint:Two simple micropayment schemes([16])
- PayWord -> user generate a pay word chain, w0,w1,w2, s.t. w(i)=h(w(i+1)). The payment is made by giving the vender the pay words and user's certificate.
- MicroMint: broker generate coins by using hash collisions.
- An efficient micropayment system based on probabilistic polling([17])
- routing in WSN
- continue voting
- 6th week
- The ThreeBallo Voting System
- Split-Ballot Voting: Everlasting Privacy With Distributed Trust
- On Auditing Elections When Precincts Have Different Sizes
- Security Considerations for Remote Electronic Voting over the Internet
- The Design and Implementation of a Secure Auction Service
- A study on Electronic Auctions
- 5th week - God, how time flies!!!!!!!!!!!!
- Identity-Based Cryptosystems and signature schemes([21])
- The original paper introducing IBE
- didn't give a encryption scheme for IBE.
- An Identity Based Encryption Scheme based on Quadratic Residue ([22])
- Alice has idenity a, Jacobi symbol (a/M)=+1, and she was given the square root r modulo M as her private key.
- Bob wants to communicate with Alice. He encrypt his message with a transport key. And he send the transport key to Alice bit by bit(for each bit he generates a number using Alice's identity and only Alice can recover this number).
- Question: I thought for a large modulo M=p*q, it is hard to decide whether a number A is a quadratic residue modulo M. But the paper says Jacobi symbol can be calculated without knowledge of the factorisation of M. don't understand.
- Identity based Encryption from the Weil Pairing([23])
- IBE Secure E-mail Project by crypto.Stanford ([24])
- Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption ([25])
- Something -> Fuzzy something
- Biometric identity is natural to use. like fingerprint
- But the fingerprint may change a little due to different environments, different sensors, etc. So we need a error tolerance (like match k out of n positions).
- for each of the attribute of user's identity, the key generation issues a private key component that is tied to the user’s random polynomial q(x).If the user is able to “match” at least d components of the ciphertext with their private key components, then they will be able to perform decryption
- Efficient Identity-Based Encryption Without Random Oracles ([26])
- Identity-based management (bandwidth-management)([27])
- Identity-based right management([28])
- Previous Right Management system is vunerable because they are based on the keys or locks.
- True Identity based Right Management is important. But it's also very hard, coz we need a good crypto foundation and an identity infrastructure which can be smoothly integrated with the rights management technology and ultimately with the end-user applications.
- Microsoft Rights Management Services. How does it work? wiki([29])
- Sun Identity Based Data Management([30])
- 4th week
- FROM USENIX SECURITY 2007
- Combating Click Fraud via Premium Clicks
- Human-Seeded Attacks and Exploiting Hot-Spots in Graphical Passwords
- Language Identification of Encrypted VoIP Traffic: Alejandra y Roberto or Alice and Bob?
- Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine
- 3rd week
- Endorsed E-Cash([31])
- produce an unlimited number of unendorsed coin from a wallet coin and they can not be linked together.
- split the coin into two parts. if the exchange aborts, user won't lose his money.
- Forward-Secure Sequential Aggregate Authentication ([32])
- (sk,pk) secrete key are updated sk'=H(sk), public key are generated accordingly by a TTP. Different key for differnet message. The signature can be aggregated as AggSig'=AggSig.Sig. Verifier can verify the signature correspondingly.
- constant signature size.
- Cryptographic Randomized Response Techniques([33])
- the difference between an election and a poll. the former requires more accurate result, has more fund to provide privacy
- Use Obliviouse transfer, zero-knowledge to build a randomized response techniques.
- Privacy-Preserving Polling using Playing Cards([34])
- A visualization of "Cryptographic Randomized Response Techniques".. intersting, easy to read
- Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Arguments for Voting([35])
- still reading, the main purpose is enforcing the voter's vote is valid. if the legla vote is {0,1}, then the vote can not vote a 100 trying to alter the result of the voting.
- 2nd week
- - Forward-Secure Signatures with Untrusted Update ([36])
- - Deniable Authentication and Key Exchange ([37])
- - Data Collection With Self-Enforcing Privacy ([38])
- here, for a honest pollster, the response from the respondents(if submitting one bit, 0,....0,1,1),the information is equal to the sum of the answers. so, why not using the privacy reserved computation?)
- Question for the model: not all the responsers are bounty hunters, release of their private information(which are the main part of the poll) will not be caught.
- - Privacy-Preserving Set Operations([39])
- - Differential Privacy([40])